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Chapter 2
Presentation of the European
Neighbouring Space
Pierre Beckouche, Karine Emsellem and Gilles Van Hamme
Abstract This chapter provides a proﬁle of Europe’s neighbouring territories. It
highlights the role of transport and energy networks, which draw the delineation of the
region. Europe is the centre of this area, and dominates the exchanges in a
core-periphery pattern with its neighbours. Yet, we show that the European influence
in the region is declining, especially in the Middle East, and in Eastern Europe where
Russia is recreating its former area of influence thanks to its Eurasian customs union.
What prospective can be ﬁgured out? The neighbourhoods offer key opportunities to
Europe in terms of workforce, markets and business opportunities. Energy, too, is a
major ﬁeld of potential cooperation and win-win opportunities with the neighbours;
but it could also prove worrisome if we cannot implement collectively the energy
transition –air pollution does not stop at EU borders. Moreover, Europe has to con-
front many challenges in its neighbourhoods: environmental risks, water scarcity,
non-inclusive growth, political unrest. The prerequisite to turn ignorance into coop-
eration is changing the Europeans’ vision on their neighbours. For the moment,
European press pays scant attention to them, as is underlined in the last section.
2.1 Overview
2.1.1 Main Figures
Climatic conditions constitute a major component of the neighbouring regions,
when it comes to the issue of transport in the North or to solar electricity potential in
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the South. Settlement is largely explained by climatic constraint, with low density
in the northernmost and in the southernmost areas (Map 2.1). In Russia the severe
continental climate contributes to explain an overall low density, even at what is
usually called “temperate” latitudes. In the Near East and in North Africa the littoral
band hosts the vast majority of the population, yet the desert extends to the littoral
in Libya between Tripolitania and Cyrenaique, and between the latter and the Nile
delta. Huge demographic concentration can be seen on the Near East littoral from
Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, western Syria up to southern Turkey around Iskenderun; and
of course in the very large cities of the neighbour countries: Moscow, Istanbul and
its Marmara’s urban region, to a much lesser extent the Maghreb large cities. But no
place in the neighbourhoods displays a bigger demographic concentration than the
Nile valley, from Luxor to the Mediterranean coast.
These countries include 508 million inhabitants (2011, national scale i.e. including
whole Russia here see Table 2.1), with a rapid growth in the Mediterranean
Map 2.1 Population at (S)NUTS 3 level, 2010
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Table 2.1 Main ﬁgures of the neighbourhoods
Coverage 24 countries i.e.:
• Faroe Islands and Greenland (to Denmark)
(Northern neighbourhood)
• Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova (Eastern
neighbourhood)
• Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro,
Kosovo (under the UN Security Council resolution
1244/99), FYROM and Albania (Western Balkans)
• Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, the
occupied Palestinian territories (OPT), Israel,
Lebanon, Syria and Turkey (Mediterranean
neighbourhood)
• NB: the three ENP Caucasian countries (Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia) are not covered by the
ITAN project
Total territory 25 million km2 (neighbouring the Arctic areas of
Canada not included)
ranging from 1400 km2 in Faroe Islands to
17 million km2 in Russia (but the sole western part of
Russia is covered by ITAN)
Share of world GDP at current prices 3.4 % in 1994 → 5.8 % in 2011
• Northern neighbourhood = 0.008 % → 0.005 %
• Eastern neighbourhood = 1.7 % → 3.0 %
• Western Balkans = 0.2 % → 0.2 %
• Mediterranean neighbourhood = 1.5 % → 2.5 %
• NB: ENP Caucasian countries = 0.03 % → 0.13 %
GDP per capita 2,017 US$/hab. in 1994 → 7,919 US$/hab. in 2011
(ranging from <1,000 US$ in Palestinian territory to
45,000 in the Faroe)
• Northern neighbourhood = 21,217→ 32,818 US$
• Eastern neighbourhood = 2,168 → 10,391 US$
• Western Balkans = 1,923 → 6,966 US$
• Mediterranean neighbourhood = 1,869 → 6,244
US$
• NB: ENP Caucasian countries = 454 → 5,253 US$
Average annual growth of GDP per
capita
8.4 % between 1994 and 2011
(ranging from −1.0 % in OPT to 16.4 % in
Bosnia-Herzegovina)
• Northern neighbourhood = 2.6 %
• Eastern neighbourhood = 9.7 %
• Western Balkans = 7.9 %
• Mediterranean neighbourhood = 7.4 %
• NB: ENP Caucasian countries = 15.5 %
Share of world population 8.1 % in 1994 → 7.3 % in 2011
• Northern neighbourhood = 0.002 → 0.002 %
• Eastern neighbourhood = 3.8 → 2.9 %
• Western Balkans = 0.4 → 0.3 %
• Mediterranean neighbourhood = 3.9 → 4.1 %
• NB: ENP Caucasian countries = 0.3 → 0.2 %
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Total population: 454 million in 1994 → 508 million in 2011
(ranging from 0.04 million in Faroe to 142 million in
Russia)
• Northern neighbourhood = 0.1 million (2011)
• Eastern neighbourhood = 200.6 million (2011)
• Western Balkans = 23.1 million (2011)
• Mediterranean neighbourhood = 284.6 million
(2011)
• NB: ENP Caucasian countries = 16.8 million (2011)
Population development
(annual growth)
+0.7 % between 1994 and 2011
(ranging from −0.7 % in Ukraine to +2.5 % in Cyprus)
• Northern neighbourhood = 0.3 %
• Eastern neighbourhood = −0.4 %
• Western Balkans = −0.1 %
• Mediterranean neighbourhood = 1.6 %
• NB: ENP Caucasian countries = 0.4 %
Proportion of population aged
0-14 years and 65 years and more
0–14 year old: 29.3 % (1994) → 22.9 % (2011)
65 and more: 8.2 % (1994) → 8.9 % (2011)
• Northern neighbourhood = n.a.
• Eastern neighbourhood = 21.6 % → 15.1 %; and
12.2 % → 13.4 %
• Western Balkans = 21.4 % → 15.8 %; and
9.1 % → 12.9 %
• Mediterranean neighb. = 37.9 % → 29.0 %; and
4.2 % → 5.5 %
• NB: ENP Caucasian countries = 30.3 %→ 19.6 %;
7.2 % → 9.4 %
Population density 21 inhabitants per km2 in 2011
(ranging from 0.1 in Greenland to 668 in occupied
Palestinian territory)
• Northern neighbourhood = 0.3 hab./km2
• Eastern neighbourhood = 12 hab./km2
• Western Balkans = 85 hab./km2
• Mediterranean neighbourhood = 42 hab./km2
• NB: ENP Caucasian countries = 93 hab./km2
Investment (gross capital formation)
as % of GDP
Approx. 25 % in 2011
(ranging from 15 % Israel to 41 % in Algeria)
Greenhouse gas emissions per capita 7.9 t CO2 equivalent in 2010 [CO2, Methane, and
Nitrous oxide, that is 98 % of the world greenhouse
gas emissions]
(ranging from 0.5 t in OPT to 15.3 t in Russia)
• Northern neighbourhood = 12.2 t per capita
• Eastern neighbourhood = 13.1 t per capita
• Western Balkans = 6.4 t per capita
• Mediterranean neighbourhood = 4.4 t per capita
• NB: ENP Caucasian countries = 5.5 t per capita
(continued)
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neighbourhood and a decrease of the population in the other neighbourhoods. As a
whole the neighbourhoods’ share of the world population is decreasing but their share
in the world’s GDP has been rising in the last ﬁfteen years, thanks to the recovery of
the former Soviet countries after the difﬁcult phase of transition, and to quite strong
economic growth in the Mediterranean neighbourhood especially in Turkey. The
overall GDP per capita of the neighbourhoods has increased from US$ 2000 in 1994
to 8000 in 2011; this means that Europe is surrounded by regions which represent
important market opportunities. As the demographic transition is deeply advanced in
all these countries including the Arab countries, the social structures and issues
(“oldies boom” namely) are converging with that of the EU.
In terms of the environment, the issues are very important (climate change,
pollution, energy resources and transition …) and diversiﬁed in such a vast area.
This can be seen with the greenhouse gas ﬁgures, which range from 0.5 t per capita
in the occupied Palestinian territory to more than 15 t in Russia. The poorest of
these countries have the lowest ﬁgures but they are rising rapidly which makes
environment a stake common to Europe and its neighbours.
The land cover map (Map 2.2) shows the different typologies of vegetation cover
in EU and the neighbourhoods. EU borders separate continuous biotopes, even if
the vegetal cover decreases rapidly southward. Due to the large geographic cov-
erage, there are many types of land areas present, from harsh climatic regions in the
North and South extremes with tundra and desert to temperate areas with croplands
Table 2.1 (continued)
Greenhouse gas emissions per GDP
in millions of euro
1000 t CO2 equivalent in 2010
(ranging from 298 t in Israel to 2186 t in Ukraine)
• Northern neighbourhood = 370 t
• Eastern neighbourhood = 1262 t
• Western Balkans = 913 t
• Mediterranean neighbourhood = 702 t
• NB: ENP Caucasian countries = 1044 t
Human development index 0.717 in 2011 [non demographically weighted
average]
(ranging from 0.582 for Morocco to 0.888 for Israel)
• Northern neighbourhood = na
• Eastern neighbourhood = 0.722 (2011)
• Western Balkans = 0.756 (2011)
• Mediterranean neighbourhood = 0.565
(1990) → 0.698 (2011)
• NB: ENP Caucasian countries = 0.717 (2011)
Notes
• “GDP 1994”: 1998 for Faroe, 2000 for Kosovo and Montenegro, 1997 for Serbia
• “GDP 2011”: 2009 for Faroe, Greenland and Libya, 2010 for Ukraine, 2005 for the occupied
Palestinian territory
• “Greenhouse gas emissions”: CO2 2009, nitrous oxide 2010, methane 2010; HFC, PFC, SF6 are
excluded (but they only represent 2 % for the total at world scale); only CO2 available for Faroe,
Greenland, Montenegro and the occupied Palestinian territory (but methane and nitrous oxide
represent small emissions compared to CO2); Kosovo: no data at all
• All data: source World Bank
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Map 2.2 Land cover, 2000
and forests. Desert is the biggest feature of all the area with about 30 % of the entire
surface, whereas croplands come second with 20 %. These croplands are concen-
trated between 43 and 55° of latitude and extend eastward but with a decreasing
gradient. This highlights the potential of the neighbourhoods for primary sectors
such as agriculture and energy generation.
2.1.2 Transport and Energy Networks Make the Region
We provide here, for the ﬁrst time, a thorough cartography of the transport network
of the greater European region ca 2010. Map 2.3 displays the network density: all
the European territory is meshed, to varying degrees but meshed nonetheless,
including eastern Europe up to Moscow and including Turkey on its European
territory up to central Anatolia. In the Arab neighbour countries, the network is
much more limited, for geo-climatic reasons as well as economic reasons.
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Map 2.3 Demographic density and main transport network in the greater European region,
ca 2010
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The road network is less dense than in the EU. This is especially true for most
remote Russian regions and for the desert areas in North Africa and eastern
Mediterranean. The network is dense in the Eastern Mediterranean coast but rapidly
becomes sparser when moving away from the coast, except in the Nile valley,
where it is fairly good up to Aswan. A similar pattern exists in the Maghreb, with
good road provision near the coast that worsens when moving far away from it. The
quality of the networks is also quite different, as the number of high capacity roads
with lane separation is much smaller in all the neighbourhoods; they only are
signiﬁcant in Turkey, part of the Eastern Mediterranean coast and part of the
Maghreb. Some borders are closed and crossing others involves long administrative
delays; this happens mainly in the southern (in particular between Morocco and
Algeria) and eastern Mediterranean countries (due to the political unrest in the Near
East), but also, to a minor extent, between Russia and Ukraine.
The rail network is sparser and patchier than the road network, and of lower
quality than in the EU, with a very limited network in the Maghreb, the Eastern
Mediterranean and Turkey. Especially noticeable is the absence of a rail network in
most of Libya. The Eastern neighbourhood however, especially Russia and
Ukraine, has a relatively good provision. While there are almost no barriers for
crossing countries by rail in the EU, many neighbour countries have borders that are
difﬁcult to cross or even completely closed, such as those between Morocco and
Algeria or Palestine and Israel. In some cases links are missing making it impos-
sible to move between neighbouring regions, as for example in the Turkey-Syria or
Israel-Jordan borders. The rail network has some additional continuity problems
across the neighbourhood as there are incompatibilities between systems in terms of
gauge and electriﬁcation. High speed rail is currently non-existent throughout all
the neighbourhoods, although several projects are at the design stage. Morocco
intends to create 1500 km of high-speed rail in the two coming decades, to thor-
oughly modernise its old inter-city network; a ﬁrst line will follow the Atlantic coast
from Agadir to Tangier and, when ﬁnancially and politically possible, Algeria.
Thanks to the Euromed Transport Forum, which gathers ministers of transports
of both sides of the Mediterranean, some transnational projects aim to give conti-
nuity to the networks, thus improving relations between countries. One of those is a
high level transport infrastructure (high-speed rail and motorway) that would one
day link the Maghreb coast from Casablanca to Tripoli in Libya.
Maps 2.4 and 2.5 give the resulting transport connectivity and accessibility in the
greater European region. The number of persons accessiblewithin a time-span of three
hours (possible return trip in the day which is an approximation for business needs for
interaction) displays a harsh contrast between western Europe and its outskirts.
A striking feature is that, along with western Turkey, the northern part of Maghreb is
linked to the European territory in terms of accessibility. Another area of important
demographic accessibility is the Nile valley but due to dramatic local demographic
density and without any connection to Europe. The Eastern neighbourhood but also,
more surprisingly, the Western Balkans, are areas of medium to quite low accessi-
bility, due limited local density and/or poor access to western Europe.
The contrast between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours is particularly
striking in the ﬁeld of energy networks, including those countries which are
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important energy providers, such as Algeria and Libya. This shows that their role,
on the greater region’s scale, remains basically that of raw material suppliers with
low local territorial development.
Map 2.6 shows the high density of gas networks in the North Sea, eastern and
central Europe. It also shows the presence of LNG export terminals in theMaghreb; it is
related to the growing “spot market” strategy of these countries, at the expense of
long-term deliveries thanks to long-term contracts in respect of which the European
Commission shows increasing reluctance. Along with the presence of major gas ﬁelds
in the North Sea, eastern Europe and Maghreb, recent discoveries in the eastern
Mediterranean have revived the disputes about maritime boundaries in the area
(Israel-Lebanon-Cyprus). The numerous projects of natural gas pipelines in the
Balkans could make them an interface between Russia and western Europe. Lastly, the
Trans-Saharan gas pipeline project linking Algeria with gas ﬁelds in the Gulf of Guinea
shows that “neighbours of the neighbours” have to be increasingly taken into account.
The main features for oil are the presence of pipelines in the neighbouring
countries (Russia, Maghreb, Near East, Caucasus), and again the numerous projects
of crude oil pipelines in the Balkans.
Map 2.4 Transport connectivity
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Map 2.5 Accessible population within 3 h
The main features for electricity are the numerous nuclear power plants in western
Europe especially Germany, France and Belgium; the very high voltage network in
Russia; the high density of the electricity grid in the centre of the EU, decreases with
distance from European metropolitan areas. The “Medring” project is a key project
for improved electricity connection between the North and the South of the
Mediterranean. It aims at connecting the North African countries between them-
selves and with European countries (Spain, Italy) using high voltage lines; a con-
nection already exists between Maghreb and western Europe, but at a low voltage.
2.1.3 The (Relative) Importance of Neighbours for Europe
In this section, we assess the regional integration between the EU space (plus
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) and the neighbour countries. The
driving question is to know if interaction (economic flows, human and migratory
flows, energy supply) shows a trend toward integration or rather de-integration.
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Our answer is threefold. Starting from the EU perspective, we ﬁrst assess the
importance of neighbourhoods for the EU in comparison to other world regions.
Then taking the reverse perspective, we assess whether the EU is important for
neighbouring countries and, moreover, how this importance has evolved across
time. Finally, changing the scale of analysis, we assess the geographical diversity of
relations between European and neighbouring countries, showing that the latter
have privileged relations with speciﬁc European countries.
Europe’s influence around the world has dramatically declined over the years
(Van Hamme 2012). It is increasingly limited to its immediate neighbourhood.
Map 2.6 Energy networks in the greater European region, ca 2010
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However, this does not mean that the neighbourhoods are the most important
partners for the EU.
From an economic point view, we ﬁrst assess the growth potential for the EU in
the decade 2010–2020 on the basis of a simple model: we extend the average growth
rate of the years 2000–2010 to the next decade; in a second step we assess what it
means for the EU, considering the current geography of its trade (the basic idea is that
EU will beneﬁt more from growth in areas where the EU currently has more market
shares). By far, the EU is the major source of potential growth for itself in the next
decade. Then we have three major market growth potentials: the US, around 11 % of
the growth potential of the EU; China, with 9 % in current $ and 19% in PPS; and the
neighbourhoods, with shares very similar to the US. However, more than half of this
potential growth is toward the East (eastern neighbours and Russia, Map 2.7);
Turkey also plays a signiﬁcant role, while the other neighbourhoods remain marginal
for the EU growth potential because of their marginal economic weight.
In trade and FDI (Table 2.2), the importance of neighbourhoods is limited. The
reason is that most trade and FDI are internal in Europe. When these internal flows
are excluded, the neighbourhoods appear as the main trade partner of the EU,
though they remain very marginal in investment flows. Indeed, 7.5 % of EU trade
takes place with the neighbourhoods, while the US only accounts for 6.2 and China
for 2.2 % of the European trade. Half of the trade toward the neighbourhoods is
with Russia and other European former Soviet Republics, while the rest is dispersed
among the different neighbourhoods.
Human flows can be tackled from two different perspectives: airflows, which
mainly take into account short-term mobility for medium and long distances, and
migrations toward Europe. Short-term mobility (airflows) is mainly intra-European
since 80 % of all movements are within European countries. Flows with neigh-
bourhoods, equally toward Turkey, former Soviet republics and Maghreb, account
for more than 7 % of the flows, more than any other part of the world. It indicates a
Map 2.7 Growth markets potential for the EU, 2010–2020
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clear distance effect. Regarding migrations, neighbourhoods account for 30 % of
the stocks of migrants in Europe, while Europeans themselves only account for
38 %. Hence, Europe and its neighbourhoods account for most of the origins of
migrants present in Europe.
Finally, neighbourhoods play also a major role for energy supply in Europe.
Europe provides 42 % of its energy while neighbourhoods provide 32.5 %, two
thirds from Russia and the rest from Maghreb, mostly Algeria and Libya. Oil and
gas producers of the Middle East play a limited role in comparison, with 9 % of the
energy supply for Europe.
What results from the ﬁgures is that neighbourhoods play an important role in
two domains: migrations and energy supply. The ENP focuses on these aspects as
well as security matters (Richard 2012). In contrast, neighbourhoods are not con-
sidered as strategic economic partners (only 7.5 % in the EU trade in goods), as well
as in many other domains such as scientiﬁc cooperation.















EU27 + (1) 70.0 71.8 0.0 80.4 37.9 42.4
Eastern neighbours
(2)
3.8 2.2 1.8 1.9 5.7 21.1
Western Balkans 0.5 0.2 3.5 0.7 6.1 0.3
Turkey 1.3 0.7 1.7 1.7 7.9 0.1
Near east (3) 0.4 0.0 3.3 0.8 1.2 0.7
Israel 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0
Maghreb 1.1 0.2 4.6 1.5 8.7 10.3
∑ Neighbourhoods 7.5 3.4 14.8 7.1 29.8 32.5
North America 6.2 17.8 1.0 4.2 1.9 2.5
Latin America 1.9 1.7 13.4 1.4 8.6 1.6
Southern Asia 1.2 0.4 14.8 0.7 5.6 0.6
Japan, Korea,
Taiwan
2.2 1.1 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.8
China 5.1 0.8 3.7 0.7 1.9 0.1
Rest of Asia and
Oceania
2.8 1.9 6.8 1.1 3.8 3.4
Sub-Saharan
Africa
1.6 0.8 44.0 1.3 7.7 5.5
Middle-East 1.7 0.5 1.5 2.0 1.7 8.6
Rest of the world 0.4 0.3 1.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes
(1) Includes Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Andorra
(2) Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, Moldavia
(3) Egypt included
Source IGEAT (Université Libre de Bruxelles)
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2.1.4 The Strong but Declining Importance of Europe
for Neighbours
We now take the reverse perspective: what is the importance of Europe within
relations of the whole set of neighbour countries with the world? Most ﬁgures
illustrate the declining importance of the EU in neighbours’ flows. The share of the
EU in neighbours’ trade is declining for all neighbours except the Eastern neigh-
bourhood (including Russia) which has become a key partner in energy. In air
flows, the EU is increasingly important for Maghreb and the Western Balkans and
the opposite trend for the Near East and Eastern neighbours.
If we now turn to the relations of the neighbours with themselves, we ﬁnd very
poor integration, with the notable exception of the Eastern neighbourhood which
has a moderate and declining economic integration but intense human and related
air flows. In the Maghreb, the integration is poor and stagnant. A similar pattern is
found in the Near East despite an important increase in human flows.
Europe is by far the main if not hegemonic partner for Western Balkans and
Maghreb—to a lesser extent for Algeria, the result of a political choice to sell oil
resources not only to Europe but also to the US. European dominance is similar for
Croatia (with ﬁgures prior to EU membership); in contrast to the Maghreb however,
Croatia maintains important relations with the neighbouring Balkans, notably
through trade and flight connections. For the former USSR, the persistence of flows
between former USSR republics explains the lower importance of Europe; Map 2.8
illustrates this situation for Ukraine for which relations are balanced between
Europe and Russia. When it comes to Russia, polarisation toward western Europe is
more intense, except for migratory stocks because of the presence of Russians in all
former USSR republics.
In the Near East, the low share of Europe in global flows is the result of the
European decline versus the increasing importance of the oil powers of the Gulf.
The Jordan case illustrates this importance of Gulf countries, even if the EU
remains an important partner for trade and the second largest donor of development
aid behind the US. For Egypt, economic flows are still dominated by Europe;
however, in terms of flight connections and migrations, relations with the Middle
East have become central. Finally, Turkey is strongly polarised toward Europe
though a little less than before (Map 2.9).
Recent trends conﬁrm the declining role of Europe for the international flows of
its neighbours. In the case of container flows by global vessel movements in 1996
and 2006, North Africa, the Black Sea and the Russian Baltic areas made rather
moderate volumes in absolute terms but the share of Europe in their total trafﬁc was
the highest. However, in ten years this European share has reduced from over 50 %
to between 30 and 50 % due to the import of manufactured goods from Asian
countries rather than from Europe. A similar pattern is obtained when considering
all commodity flows (containers but also bulks, vehicles, general cargo) for the year
2004: more than 50 % of North Africa and the Black Sea/Russian Baltic areas’
trafﬁcs was with European countries, but this time with higher absolute volumes
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due to the great importance of liquid bulk trafﬁcs such as natural gas, crude oil, and
reﬁned oil, the rest of such trafﬁc being imported by Europe through pipelines and
therefore not being counted in maritime flows. Data for containers and bulks in
2004 and 2011 conﬁrm the drastic shrink of Europe’s external maritime influence
globally but with a maintained dominance in its nearest regions, those of Eastern
and Southern neighbourhoods.
Looking to the 1990–2012 period, we observe similarities with the evolution of
flight connections. The most striking changes take place in the Near East: in the last
two decades, we observe a reorientation of flows toward the Middle East mainly to
the disadvantage of western Europe for Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. There has also
been a rapid decline in western Europe for flight connections with Israel and
Turkey, though this results from diversiﬁcation rather than the emergence of a new
polarisation.
Map 2.8 The geography of relations of Ukraine, around 2010
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Map 2.9 The geography of relations of Turkey, around 2010
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2.1.5 The Prevailing Core-Periphery Pattern
Most EU neighbours can be considered as semi-peripheral or peripheral countries
(Van Hamme and Pion 2012). It reflects the dependence on Europe in qualitative
and quantitative terms. Europe is more important to its neighbours than the
neighbours are for Europe. Moreover, the exchanges are unequal in their nature: the
EU buys primary or low added value manufactured products while selling products
with medium and high technological content. Some countries tend to move from a
pure peripheral position, mainly selling primary goods, toward specialisation in low
added value manufacturing goods: Turkey and Tunisia are the best examples; Egypt
is less clearly engaged in this path while Morocco is still highly specialized in
mining and agricultural products. Last, qualiﬁed labour force is attracted to western
Europe while tourist flows take the reverse direction (Grasland and Van Hamme
2010; Van Hamme 2012).
Let us detail the cases of Tunisia and Turkey’s trade, two typical examples. With
western Europe, by far their main partner, both countries show a negative balance in
all sophisticated products (chemical, mechanical industry etc.) and a positive bal-
ance in agro-food and textile goods; with more peripheral countries (North African
neighbours for Tunisia or Gulf countries for Turkey), both countries show positive
balances in all types of products except primary goods. A similar pattern is
observed for the Ukraine, buying sophisticated goods in western and central
Europe, while having a positive balance in these goods with Russia, their ﬁrst trade
partner. More peripheral positions are also observed as in the case of Morocco: the
country has a positive trade balance in textile and primary goods and negative
balances in other types of products, whichever region Morocco is trading with.
2.1.6 Neighbours’ Preferential Relations with Speciﬁc EU
Countries
In Map 2.10 on air connections, development aid, migratory stocks and trade
around 2010, countries are classiﬁed according to the relative intensity of their
relations. Countries of Europe and of the neighbourhoods are grouped together if
their relations are more intense than expected on the base of their respective size:
– The ﬁrst coherent area includes south-western Europe and the Maghreb; the
precise limits of this group vary according to the flows considered but it always
includes France, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. It conﬁrms the strong polari-
sation of the Maghreb toward this part of Europe, along with low interrelations
between countries of the Maghreb.
– Former USS republics are always grouped together forming a second coherent
area.
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– Germany also forms a third coherent area with central-eastern European coun-
tries. In the case of air and cooperation flows, this area is grouped together with
former USSR.
All these geographical analyses drive to the following synthesis:
– The former USSR is the only part of the neighbourhoods which forms a
cohesive area, with declining, though important, interrelations. As a result,
Russian neighbours such as the Ukraine, Moldavia or Belarus are equally
polarised by Russia and the European Union;
– The Western Balkans, though maintaining important internal relations, are
nearly exclusively turned towards the EU, mainly central Europe but also, in
relative terms, Nordic countries;
Map 2.10 Privileged relations within the greater European region, 2010. Note countries of
Europe and neighbour countries are grouped together if their relations are more intense than
expected on the base of their respective size. For each pair of country, we thus calculate their
theoretical relations according to their respective size, compare them with real flows through a
Chi2, and then group countries according to the intensity of these relations
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– The Maghreb remains highly polarised toward Europe, mainly south-western
Europe. Unlike the former USSR, countries of the Maghreb have poor internal
relations, each country being strongly polarised toward Europe;
– Turkey is strongly, though decreasingly, oriented toward Europe in its external
relations but does not belong to any cohesive regional area;
– The Near East, including Egypt, is decreasingly oriented toward Europe and has
seen the influence of the Gulf powers increase considerably in the last decade.
2.2 The Neighbourhoods: Opportunities and Challenges
for Europe
In this section, we compare the greater European region to other world leading
regions, namely East Asia and North America. Within the European region we
distinguished between western Europe and the new member states (who became
members in 2004 and 2007) because these former European neighbours constitute a
useful comparison for the actual neighbours.
2.2.1 Opportunities: Labour Forces, Markets, Investment
For European actors, the neighbourhoods constitute opportunities because of their
natural resources, but there are other reasons. Neighbourhoods are opportunities
thanks to their demographic and economic size, which is increasing, in particular in
the Mediterranean neighbourhood, although the previous section showed that
European investment there is low and declining. Here we seek to understand the
statement from the previous section: that the neighbourhoods could represent more
than 11 % of the global potential growth for Europe in the coming decade.
2.2.1.1 Population Dynamic and Rising Role of Diasporas
The 508 million population of the neighbour countries (2011) increases rapidly in
the South, mostly in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey is a transitional country in
many senses. The demographic transition is largely advanced there, and the national
territory is split into demographically rising territories and declining territories. For
a small part of their national territories, this is also beginning to happen in Tunisia
and in Morocco, with an overall strong demographic growth. Conversely, the
demographic decline of almost all the Balkans and Eastern neighbour territories is
striking (Map 2.11).
Map 2.12 shows that the young people of the region are concentrated in the Near
East and in some southern parts of North Africa. The older population—considered
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as an asset when it comes to know-how or as a burden when it comes to pension
funding issues—is concentrated in Europe, the Eastern neighbourhood included.
Another demographic asset has to be emphasised: Europe beneﬁts from an
important diaspora coming from its neighbourhoods (Fig. 2.1). Given the growing
role of diasporas in economic and cultural development, it is important for
European public opinion to consider migrants in a new way: they used to be all too
often regarded as a social problem (integration, education…), they should be
regarded as a solution, even more so given that their level of education is rising. It is
of utmost relevance to think in terms of “mobility” rather than of “migration”,
because the actual economy is based on the former much more than on the latter.
People who live in western Europe as foreigners increasingly come from the
neighbourhoods, namely the Mediterranean, and from Sub-Saharan Africa which is
an extension of the European area of influence. This is an asset to rely on, given the
Map 2.11 The demographic growth in the greater European region, 2000–2010
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Map 2.12 Today’s and tomorrow’s demographic growth, children under 15 in the greater region,
2010
Fig. 2.1 Europe beneﬁts from an important diaspora from its neighbours
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foreseen development of Africa in the coming century—which, for the moment,
mostly beneﬁts world players other than Europe (Map 2.13).
2.2.1.2 Markets
Figure 2.2 on world markets shows several meanings of the “European region”: EU
(plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland) plus Western Balkans, plus the
Eastern neighbours, plus the Mediterranean neighbours, plus sub-Saharan Africa. In
all cases, the contrast of its declining share of the world’s GDP is striking vis-à-vis
the huge rise of the East Asian share. But indeed, the larger the European region,
the higher its place in the world economy.
Figure 2.3 compares the GDP growth since 1980 in the various neighbourhoods
of Europe. Almost all of these neighbourhoods have impressive economic growth,
Map 2.13 Dependency ratio in the greater European region, a typology
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Fig. 2.2 World markets: can we cope with the rise of the East Asian region?
Fig. 2.3 The neighbourhoods, a driver for European economic growth
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expressed in constant currency; this is undeniably an asset for Europe. Second, the
economic hierarchy has dramatically changed: previously, the Eastern neighbour-
hood was ﬁrst and the new member states second, they are now in third and fourth
position, whilst the Mediterranean and Middle-East neighbourhoods have become
ﬁrst and second; the Western Balkans are now lagging behind.
This analysis has to be tempered by several facts: (i) the huge transition expe-
rienced by the former Socialist countries, with much better growth rates in the
2000s of course; (ii) the driving role of Israel and Turkey among the Mediterranean
neighbours, whose performance is much lower if one takes into account the sole
Arab countries; (iii) the Arab countries performance is dampened by on-going
unrest and wars. Before the beginning of the Arab Spring, the World Bank was
forecasting growth rates in 2011 of 4 % in Morocco, Jordan and Algeria, 5 % in
Tunisia and Syria, 6 % in Egypt, 7 % in Lebanon; the real rates have been much
lower, and nobody knows how long this difﬁcult political transition will last. Still, it
has to be highlighted that the European neighbourhoods' growth is experiencing a
long term shift from East to South, which is due to continue given the demographic
ﬁgures presented in the previous section.
The previous section has shown the declining economic integration between
Europe and its neighbours. Beyond the European case, the general trend throughout
the world is that of a slowing down of economic integration within the major
regions over the 2000s, due to the booming importance of a new global player:
China, which has become a major trade partner of the countries of the world
whichever region they belong to. Should we conclude that the regional integration
era is over? Certainly not, because the long run remains in favour of the region-
alisation thesis. In the 1960s, only one third of the trade of European countries
occurred between themselves and trading links were lower still between the United
States, Canada and Mexico. The respective regions are far more integrated today.
The major difference between Japan or the US and Europe is that the latter trades
very much within the EU and very little with the emerging countries of its
neighbourhood (Fig. 2.4).
Over the three last decades, the new European member states have drastically
reoriented their trade towards western Europe, instead of the former Soviet bloc.
But the reverse is true for the neighbourhoods, which conﬁrms that EU membership
is a driver to regional trade integration whereas a neighbour’s status leads to
declining integration with Europe. All neighbourhoods of Europe, in the widest
sense, including sub-Saharan Africa and Gulf states, send a decreasing share of
their exports to Europe and European products represent a decreasing share of their
imports. This can be considered good news if it means a wider insertion of these
countries in the global economy. This can also be regarded as bad news for
Europe’s influence which remains high in its neighbourhoods though undoubtedly
declining. The rising markets of the neighbourhoods are an opportunity for Europe
to regain its economic influence over them.
42 P. Beckouche et al.
2.2.1.3 Investment
The East Asian region’s boom is based on the complementarity between its national
economies: highly developed (Japan), developed (Dragons), and emerging
(China…). The developed countries have found growth drivers in their emerging
neighbourhood. Figure 2.5 shows this clearly for the investment rate in the Asian
Fig. 2.5 Investments in the peripheries of the Triad, slowdown in the centres
Fig. 2.4 The role of the developing neighbours is high in East Asian and American regions
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region. The complementarities are less obvious between the US and Latin America
but nevertheless do exist. In the European region this is the case for Morocco, for
instance, but not for Egypt, whilst Ukraine shows a chaotic path. Moreover, since
the Arab spring, investment in the Mediterranean neighbourhood has diminished.
The Mediterranean neighbours remain marginal players in the world’s FDI
flows. North Africa attracts less than 1 % of the world’s FDI inflows, the Arab Near
East (i.e. Near-East excluding Israel and Turkey) less than 0.5 %. Turkey is rising
but attracts less than 0.8 %. Altogether the Western Balkans and the Eastern
neighbourhood attracted 1.1 % of the world’s FDI inflows in the 1990s and 4.3 % in
the 2000s. But these ﬁgures remain far removed from Asian records. Under the
impetus of Japanese enterprises, emerging East Asia attracted 7 % of the world’s
FDI inflows in the 1970s, 9 % in the 1990s and 15.5 % (China’s boom) in the
2000s. The post-crisis period conﬁrms this mega trend: in 2007 China attracted US
$85 bn, in 2011 the ﬁgure reached US$125 bn; the other emerging countries of East
Asia US$150 bn and US$210 bn. As a whole, in 2011, the emerging East Asian
countries attracted 22 % of the world’s FDI inflows—far ahead of Latin America
(10 %), not to speak of the European neighbour countries. In 2014 the ﬁgure for
emerging East Asian countries reached… 34 % of the world FDI inflows, and was
under 7 % for the European neighbourhoods (Map 2.14).
The low attention paid by the European investors to their neighbourhoods is at
stake (Fig. 2.6). At the end of the 2000s, the emerging countries of the region
attracted 21 % of Japan FDI outflows, 10 % of US FDI outflows, but only 4 % of
European FDI outflows—much less in the Mediterranean neighbourhood despite
the fact that many of its territories are experiencing rapid growth.
Seen from the emerging countries’ standpoint, the geography of FDI flows is
different, because they rely heavily on investments originating from their developed
neighbours. For example Morocco, Tunisia or even Turkey FDI inflows come
principally from Europe: 85 % for Morocco, 57 % for Tunisia and 77 % for Turkey
at the end of the 2000s. What is the evolution? Again, the role of Europe as FDI
provider for the Mediterranean neighbours is declining: from more than 50 % at the
beginning of the 2000s to 30 % in 2010 (whilst the ﬁgure is 20 % for the Gulf as the
origin of FDI invested in the Mediterranean neighbourhood).
In the other regions the ﬁgures are similar: half of FDI flows in Mexico come
from the US; the bulk of FDI flows in China or Thailand comes from Japan and the
Dragons (along with Caribbean tax havens) (Maps 2.15 and 2.16).
Map 2.17 displays the FDI inflows in the European neighbourhoods at local
scale. Russia, Israel and Turkey are the main targets, despite the latter showing a per
capita record lower than expected; Maghreb is less targeted than the Near East,
which highlights the potential in the Maghreb countries. Some peculiar territories
appear here and there, for instance Ukrainian Ivano-Frankivskiy oblast at the border
of Slovakia, with rising FDI since 2008 in the ﬁelds of chemistry and food business,
mostly from western European countries (60 %) and from the Russian economic
area of influence (Russia, Serbia, Cyprus and… Virgin Islands: 40 %)—a symbol of
the contest between the European Union and Russia upon Ukraine.
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Map 2.14 FDI inflows and share in GDP in the 2000s
Fig. 2.6 Europeans do not invest in their neighbourhoods
2 Presentation of the European Neighbouring Space 45


















FDI inflows (million euros), annual average 2006-2008
10 0003 0001 000500100
© CNRS GIS CIST, ITAN, 2013
This map does not
necessarily reflect the



































































































































© CNRS GIS CIST, ITAN, 2013
This map does not
necessarily reflect the



























































































































































Map 2.16 Where do FDI in-flows come from? The case ofMexico, Thailand and China 2006–2008
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2.2.2 Energy: Threat or Opportunity?
2.2.2.1 Strategic Complementarities
The EU’s energy dependency will reach 65 % by 2025; for gas it will reach 80 %.
Unlike the EU, the European neighbour countries possess a large amount of the
world’s resources:
Map 2.17 The FDI inflows in the neighbourhoods, SNUTS 2
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– notwithstanding the Arctic potential resources (see Map 2.18), the Eastern
neighbourhood possesses an impressive part of the world’s energy; Russia alone
holds 32 % of world proven natural gas reserves, 12 % of the proven oil reserves
and 10 % of the explored coal reserves. It procures a third of the hydrocarbons
imported by Europe and a quarter of its coal imports. Other countries of the area
such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan also hold some hydrocarbons reserves.
– Mediterranean neighbours possess 5 % of the world’s oil resources and 3 % of
its gas; they supply one third of the gas and one quarter of the oil consumed in
Europe, as well as transit (Turkey, from both Russian and Gulf production).
Production and transit countries are similarly dependent on European consumer
markets: 70 % of North Africa’s oil exports and 90 % of its gas exports are sent
Map 2.18 Main natural resources and sea ice extent in the Arctic
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to Europe, despite the aforementioned rising share of the US in Algerian sales.
The potential for energy collaboration in the Mediterranean is therefore strate-
gic. It could be the basis of an ambitious social (employment), industrial,
technological and environmental partnership.
2.2.2.2 How the EU Tries to Reduce Its Dependence upon Russia
and How It Barely Manages
Here we focus on the gas issue, for two reasons. One is the rising share of gas in the
energy mix of Europe and its neighbours (lower greenhouse gas emission than oil).
Two is the strong geographical dimension of gas delivery since oil is mostly
delivered on the spot market (by boat) whereas gas is mostly delivered by pipes
which can hardly be longer than 3–4000 km for cost and safety reasons.
The security of energy supplies is a particular concern in the EU because most of
the EU member states rely on energy imports from Russia. Moreover, Russian
interests rise in European gas distribution and production. For instance Russian
ﬁrms own one third of Estonia’s and Latvia’s and 37 % of Lithuania’s energy ﬁrms.
The high dependency on Russian procurement sometimes crosses the line for
autonomy, especially in central Europe like in the Baltic States where 100 % of
natural gas and almost of oil imports come from Russia.
The EU has been seeking to limit Russia’s influence on the European energy
market, in connection with the gas supply disruptions of 2006 and 2009 by the
Russian export monopoly Gazprom. Although the situation has now stabilized
somewhat, the uneasy relations of the transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus, with
Russia are a serious factor in the instability of energy supply in the region. In the
light of these events, Russia is developing new pipelines to the EU by-passing
Ukraine and Belarus, which would secure stability of energy exports to the EU and
avoid dependency on transit countries.
The Nord Stream pipeline transports gas from Russia through the Baltic Sea
directly to Germany, by-passing the Baltic States. The pipeline runs through the
waters of ﬁve countries in the Baltic Sea region: Finland, Sweden, Denmark,
Germany and Russia. It started operations in 2011 after ﬁerce criticism from
Estonia for environmental and safety reasons, claiming that hosting a strategic
Russian asset could create a security threat for the Baltic countries.
Some analysts argue that with new pipelines and seaports projects, Russia is
attempting to re-establish its geopolitical influence in the former Soviet countries and
in Europe at large. Others argue that the Atlanticist powers (mainly US and UK) are
seeking to promote Russophobia in Europe in order to “prevent the rise of the
European Union as a powerful competitor, partly with the strategic aim of pre-
venting the integration of a Great Eurasian space extending from Vladivostok to
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Lisbon” (Eskelinen et al. 2013, p. 119). According to this interpretation, the new
pipelines are seen as means to unite Europe. Active lobbying of the US against the
new pipelines, as well as American support for the colour revolutions in Ukraine and
Georgia are among the arguments supporting this view. There is also a third opinion,
according to which Russia is more likely to be driven by solely economic interests.
A new energy strategy for Europe 2011–2020 contributes to limiting EU
dependence on Russian energy sources. The strategy seeks to promote a more
widespread use of renewable energy and reduce oil and natural gas consumption in
the long run. Secondly, it seeks to diversify the EU’s energy imports in order to avoid
dependency on a single supplier. For this reason the EU has supported several pro-
jects by-passing Russian territory, such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the
planned Nabucco gas pipeline. The Nabucco project was initially intended to secure
gas from Iraq and Iran, but given the current political and economic instabilities in the
two countries it adjusted, with main potential suppliers being Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan, and Romania since the discovery in 2012 of a large gas ﬁeld in the
Black Sea. The Nabucco project was originally backed by several European Union
member states and by the United States, and was seen as a rival to the Russian South
Stream pipeline project (Russian pipeline under the Black Sea to south-eastern
Europe, construction started in December 2012). Since then, Azerbaijan has stated
that the gas will be transported only through those routes which would be commer-
cially most attractive, which means not necessarily by Nabucco; also the opening of
the Central Asia-China gas pipeline and the agreements to build the Russian South
Stream pipeline have provoked the abandoning of the Nabucco project in 2014.
2.2.2.3 The Two Drivers of a Common Energy Policy Between Europe
and the Neighbour Countries
The maps below synthesise the main energy issue in the region. Map 2.19 shows
the importance of Eastern neighbourhood—read Russia—in the primary energy
consumed in Europe. Russia is the main provider of crude oil and natural gas with
more than a third of the EU imports. Europe itself stands second (Norway provide
14 % of the crude oil and 28 % of the natural gas imported by the EU) but as said,
this ratio decreases rapidly. The Mediterranean neighbourhood stands in the third
place (Libya with 10 % of the crude oil imports and Algeria with 14 % of the
natural gas). Oil and gas ﬁelds in northern Africa have not yet been fully developed,
and in the near future they might become the primary source of oil and gas for
Europe; Algeria might also become a transit country for the gas coming from
Nigeria if the Trans-Saharan pipeline were to be built.
Map 2.20 demonstrates the complementarities between Europe and its neigh-
bours: trade deﬁcits (except Norway) in Europe, trade surpluses in most in the
neighbourhoods—even though some neighbours are confronted to deﬁcits: Western
Balkans, Morocco, Tunisia, Near East except Syria, Moldova and Ukraine.
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Map 2.21 shows the huge rise of energy demand in the southern neighbour-
hoods. This means at the same time, (i) huge potential markets for European energy
enterprises which could ﬁnd opportunities in these booming countries; in particular,
in the coming decades no area in the world will experience a more rapid electricity
demand growth than the South Mediterranean. And (ii) a threat if this boom is
managed with low energy efﬁciency and high greenhouse gas emissions. Map 2.22
speaks about the threat: these booming southern neighbours depend very much on
hydrocarbons. As this is also the case in the Eastern neighbourhood, the map
Map 2.19 Energy consumed in the European Union: the key role of the neighbourhoods
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displays a striking contrast between the EU where the energy transition has really
begun, and the neighbourhoods. The consequence is given in Map 2.23: greenhouse
gas emissions have been booming in the southern neighbours. Indeed they started
with a low level of emission but they are clearly catching up.
The conclusion is clear. An in-depth cooperation with the neighbourhoods in the
ﬁeld of energy would provide Europe with two key advantages: one is the security
of procurements; two is a common policy in favour of energy transition and the
ﬁght against greenhouse gas.
Map 2.20 Energy net trade: the complementary between Europe and its neighbours, 2011
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Map 2.21 The huge rise in energy demand in the neighbourhoods, 1990–2011
Map 2.22 Share of fossil fuels in energy consumption, 2011
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2.2.3 Challenges: Environmental Risks, Water Scarcity,
Non-inclusive Growth, Political Unrest
2.2.3.1 Environmental Risks
It is impossible to give a comprehensive view of all the environmental challenges of
all the neighbourhoods. Here we briefly highlight some examples, taken in two
neighbourhoods and in the ﬁelds of earthquakes, climate change and water—which
have direct impacts on the EU territory.
In the Eastern neighbourhood several environmental issues have direct impacts
on the EU territory: the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear tragedy in 1986,
environmental problems linked to industrial processes, military heritage, radioactive
and toxic waste, poor status of the water environment, and the pollution of the
Black and Baltic seas.
Map 2.23 Mediterranean neighbours are catching up: greenhouse gas emission, 1990–2010
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The Western Balkans have to deal with the legacy of pollution inherited from the
socialist period: concentration of highly polluted zones in industrial centres or
exploitation of mineral raw materials now closed are the major sources of unsolved
solid waste and other environmental problems. Even if in the 1990s conflict and the
economic crisis reduced the pollution from agriculture and industry, the rehabilita-
tion of all polluted industrial and mining-energy sites remains one of the main issues.
In contrast, the Balkan countries beneﬁt from exceptional landscape diversity and
biodiversity; for example, Albania has a concentration of 30 % of European plant
species. This potential needs to be protected, but in 2007 only 6.5 % of the overall
Balkans territory was placed under protected areas, ranging from 0.8 % of the
territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 10.4 % in Albania (EEA 2010).
In the last two decades, the Western Balkans were confronted with two rising
issues:
(i) Waste management of both industrial activities and municipalities, which
threatens the quality of soils and water. The generation of municipal waste has
risen steadily, and it is more and more convergent with EU levels.
(ii) The risk management of floods and droughts, which requires international
cooperation. The area seems to be one of the most vulnerable to climate
change with signiﬁcant floods in the northern part (Danube river basin) and
severe droughts in the southern part. The international cooperation is enhanced
by the International Commission for the Protection of the River Danube.
Other projects have stressed the coming impact of climate change on the Black
Sea area and in particular on Ukraine. The different scenarios of the Envirogrid
project are not convergent with the impact on agriculture, but they are convergent
with the rising scarcity of water (Map 2.24).
Concerning the Mediterranean neighbourhood, we illustrate the environmental
stakes through the earthquakes issue and the water issue. The numerous earth-
quakes in the Mediterranean and historic tsunamis prove that the threat remains
high. This calls for a cooperation between Europe and its neighbours (which has
largely begun e.g. between Greece and Turkey) in the three domains of (i) common
alert system, training and exchanges of experiences in the ﬁeld of crisis manage-
ment or insurance issues; (ii) concerted actual crisis management; (iii) post-crisis
reconstruction (Map 2.25).
Along with north-western India, the Mediterranean is the region of the world for
which climate change scenarios converge the most seriously. The water shortage will
particularly impact Egypt (Fig. 2.7). The water exploitation index is high in the water
basins of the Mediterranean, and not only on the southern side: compared to available
water resources, withdrawals have been historically high in previous decades, espe-
cially in the Near East, in Libya and Tunisia but also in Greece and Spain: the water
issue is not only a neighbour concern (Map 2.26). The available water resources are
not sustainable in the South, because of their considerable reliance on groundwater.
As an example, in Tunisia, which is one of the most efﬁcient of the Arab countries
in the ﬁeld of water and sanitation, improvement in drinkable water (Map 2.27) and
sewage (Map 2.28) raises various problems: (i) ecological, since the water resources
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Map 2.24 Black Sea catchment: water stress days and their changes in the 21st century
Map 2.25 Earthquakes in the Euro-Mediterranean area since the beginning of the 20th century
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Fig. 2.7 Mediterranean neighbourhood: water deﬁcit at horizon 2050
Map 2.26 Water resource per inhabitant, 2000s
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are taken from non-renewed groundwater. (ii) managerial, since the know-how is
lacking in both the governance and technical aspects. (iii) political, since the mod-
ernisation of the water service would need an increase of the water tariffs that the
government cannot undertake. (iv) ﬁnancial, since the needs for modernisation of the
water and, above all, the sanitation infrastructure remain huge. (v) territorial, since
the North-West of the country (water and sewage) and the South (sanitation) are
lagging behind the North-East. The water issue is one of the most important corner
stones for an enhanced cooperation between Europe and its neighbours.
2.2.3.2 Non-inclusive Growth
The issue of inclusive growth is at stake at many scales:
– locally because of the poor quality of development, access to universal services
such as water, and people participation in the neighbour territories’ governance;
– at national scale because the regional disparities are rising in particular in
countries such as Tunisia or Turkey;
– at the scale of the greater European region, where the discontinuities are not
sustainable. Figure 2.8 compares the GDP per capita in purchasing power parity
Map 2.27 Is the progress in access to drinkable water sustainable? The case of Tunisia
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(PPP) in the three major world regions. In East Asia, the Dragons have clearly
caught up with Japan, and the emerging countries (including China) are pro-
gressively bridging the gap. In the Americas, the emerging Latin America does
not ﬁll the gap vis-à-vis the USA, but (i) the US experienced a rapid growth of
Fig. 2.8 The gap of development does not decrease between Europe and its neighbours
Map 2.28 Low progress in sewage. The case of Tunisia
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their GDP per capita, and (ii) Latin America is at level 25 (Mexico excluded,
100 = USA). In the European region, apart from Israel and Turkey, the gap
remains huge: the Arab Mediterranean neighbour countries hardly reach a level
of 20 (Eurozone = 100).
The ITAN composite indicators provide several key pieces of information to
assess the insufﬁciently inclusive development of the neighbourhoods. To begin
with, simple classic indicators such as demographic evolution, education and
income shed light on sharp territorial disparities.
Map 2.29 on the demographic evolution in the 2000s displays the major dis-
continuities in the greater region. Except in south-eastern Europe vis-à-vis Turkey,
major discontinuities are not that signiﬁcant between Europe and its neighbours
than within the neighbourhoods. Between Europe and the Eastern neighbourhood,
Map 2.29 Demographic evolution in Europe and in the neighbourhoods
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there is rather a progressive gradient from positive demographic growth in the
westernmost Europe to a mixed situation in Germany and a negative growth when
one crosses the external borders eastward and lastly a very clear decline in many
Russian territories. Within Russia, a strong discontinuity appears between the
Moscow urban area and its surrounding regions. In Ukraine, apart from Kyiv City,
all territories are demographically declining.
Within the Western Balkans, globally in demographic decline, discontinuities
appear in Serbia and between Kosovo and the Fyrom: the demographic issue is
indubitably one of the stakes of the Western Balkans territories. Discontinuities also
appear vis-à-vis the EU territories of northern Greece and western Bulgaria. In the
Mediterranean neighbourhood, major discontinuities appear within Morocco,
within Algeria, within Tunisia, within Egypt, within Israel, and, mainly, within
Turkey, because these countries are experiencing a rapid urbanisation process as
well as an economic transition with severe contrasts between developing areas and
left behind territories. Here, the stake would rather be to transfer European
know-how in the ﬁelds of territorial planning and regional policy, to the neigh-
bourhoods. It seems to be particularly important in the case of Turkey.
Another stake of the greater region is education. The Mediterranean neighbours
have managed rapid progress in school enrolment. Yet, many difﬁculties remain, in
particular in rural areas, in particular for women, in particular for those over 30 years.
But an unexpected concern appears also for young girls: in secondary school, many
more of them are enrolled than their elders and their male counterparts, because at
this stage boys all too often drop out. The contrast is incredibly high between
over-representation of girls in secondary school and under-representation of women
on the labour market, in particular outside of metropolitan areas. This suggest a
future rising concern for South Mediterranean women, namely in the
non-metropolitan areas, when these now very numerous educated girls will have
become young women looking for—lacking—jobs. In the ﬁeld of education, the
contrast between Europe and the Mediterranean neighbourhood is one of the highest
among all the indicators (Map 2.30), which also means that potential cooperation in
that ﬁeld seems boundless between Europe and its neighbours.
Very much related to the previous indicator is the income issue. Map 2.31 shows
the gap between the Russian, Israeli and western Turkish territories on the one
hand, and almost all the other neighbour countries on the other. Again, the issue of
internal inequality proves relevant, particularly in Turkey, Egypt, Algeria and
Tunisia where the contrast between the littoral or the capital city area and the inner
country is impressive. In the Near East, the contrast between Israel and the rest of
the area is a part of the geopolitical mix (see below Sect. 6.1.3). In the Western
Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania appear as the most unequal countries
(we do not have regional income data for Serbia). In Ukraine the contrast is strong
between the capital city and the rest of the country where income seems evenly low.
Section 4.4 below explains that these rising inter-regional disparities within Ukraine
are a key factor of the on-going civil war there.
The evolution of Human development sums up the previous analyses and pro-
vides further information. The ITAN project carried out an analysis at
2 Presentation of the European Neighbouring Space 61
macro-regional scale, at national scale and at local scale thanks to the local Human
Development Index (HDI) deﬁned in Sect. 1.3.2. The Eastern neighbourhood is
recovering after its harsh 1990s decade, and the Mediterranean neighbours keep on
improving (Map 2.32). As a whole, the divide between Europe and its neighbours
has rather decreased in the 2000s. The Mediterranean neighbours seem to beneﬁt
from their long run effort in education, even though many shortcomings remain.
Life expectancy is improving in the Eastern neighbourhoods but for Russia only
and at a low level, in particular for men.
Map 2.33 gives an idea of the added value of ITAN thanks to the calculation of
local HDI. Its ﬁrst output is to conﬁrm that local realities rely very much on national
structures, especially in human development where national public policies are
Map 2.30 High education level in the European region, 2000s
62 P. Beckouche et al.
determinant for health and education. In Russia, Ukraine and Egypt, local records
more or less equal the national values, despite some peculiarities such as the
Belgorod Russian oblast at the immediate north-eastern periphery of Ukraine (this
territory hosts energy and in particular nuclear activities, with high salaries and
educated people). But in other countries, internal disparities are conﬁrmed, espe-
cially in Tunisia and Turkey. Map 2.34 uses a simpler way to express the indicator,
and stresses the discontinuities.
Map 2.35 gives the cartographic output of another ITAN composite indicator:
territorial dynamics. The typology set up here keeps the distinction between
demographic evolution (very much in favour of the Mediterranean territories and
Map 2.31 Income per capita in the neighbourhoods, ca 2010
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not at all of Eastern) and economic evolution. As a whole, the dynamic is conﬁrmed
to be rather in the South than in the East, despite some Mediterranean neighbour
countries are very worrisome because their strong dynamic is demographically
driven and not economically sustained (see southern Algeria for instance). The
situation of greater Cairo in Egypt is not easily readable given the delineation of the
Egyptian governorates.
But when it comes to territorial potential, the last composite indicator of the
ITAN project, the advantages seem to be clearly in the East—read Russia and not
Ukraine—rather than in the South, with Turkey in an intermediate position and
with, again, great internal heterogeneity. Here, the Moscow and Israeli territories
are far ahead, but several territories in upper Nile Egypt show up. Maghreb,
meanwhile, is lagging behind (Map 2.36). The Map also shows that at the begin-
ning of the 2010s, Syria's record was not so bad; one can imagine its collapse after
four years of civil war.
Map 2.32 Evolution of the human development index, national scale, 2000–2011
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Map 2.33 Local human development typology, 2010
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Map 2.34 Local human development, index and discontinuities in the neighbourhoods, 2010
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Map 2.35 Territorial dynamics, 2000–2010
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Map 2.36 Territorial potential, 2010
2.2.3.3 Political Challenges
They are many. They sometimes have direct territorial impacts or origin. Table A in
annex gives an overview of the contested territories in the neighbourhoods. One of
these challenges is related to the minority issue—long a cultural treasure of the
greater region, of course, but undoubtedly it is a component of many of the con-
tested territories. Due to the lack of reliable information, it would require a whole
research project per se to gather the minority needed data. And such a project would
prove hard: Arab states’ censuses increasingly delete questions about religion or
“ethnicity”, because these issues are increasingly sensitive—not to mention the
Lebanese case where the census is postponed for decades so as to avoid any
question on Christians and Muslims' demography.
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2.2.4 The Neighbours’ International Openness as a Major
Stake for Interaction with Europe
The methodology of the ITAN International openness index distinguishes two
approaches, one weighted by time-distance to international transport facilities
which highlights accessibility; and one non-weighted, which highlights the
agglomeration effects.
The maps below show the three components of (non-weighted) international
openness and then their synthetic index (Maps 2.37, 2.38, 2.39 and 2.40). There are
two keys of interpretation of this ﬁnal synthetic indicator of international openness:
country effect and metropolitan effect. First, bigger and/or more developed coun-
tries have, in general, higher internationalisation; this was an expected result.
However, the strong concentration in the capital city of the country is tempered by
the geography of the major ports, often located in another city, which is an
important pattern of the neighbourhoods’ geography.
Map 2.37 Foreign direct investments, 2008–2012
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Map 2.38 International air trafﬁc, 2012
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Map 2.39 International port trafﬁc, 2011
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Map 2.40 Geography of local international openness index, around 2010
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In the synthesis map, we also take into account the demographic size of the
territorial units. This highlights the international openness of Israeli territories, and
the low international openness of the North African territories although we saw that
their potential accessibility to the European territory is very high. This suggests
important avenues for territorial development there, to take better advantage of
these North African territories’ international situation. The strong position of the
Istanbul area is all the more impressive as it is not only due to maritime flows but
also to air flight and foreign investment. In Russia, the overarching dominance of
Moscow appears clearly on the map.
Maps 2.41 and 2.42 show the two components of openness which have been
weighted by time-distance to transport facilities: air and maritime connexions. What
is striking is the low performance, again, of Maghreb territories except in northern
Morocco, but also of the Western Balkans (except Croatia for maritime openness).
This reveals important avenues for further transport development in these parts of
the neighbourhoods.
Map 2.41 International air trafﬁc, 2012. Values weighted by time-distance to the airports
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2.3 Do Europeans Care About Their Neighbourhoods?
An Analysis of Media Data
This section analyses the European representation about the neighbourhoods as
seen by the European press. It gives a ﬁrst overview of the tremendous advantage
than researchers can take from the media databases and their geographical treat-
ment. They can provide a robust picture of spatial representation and mental
images—a tricky ﬁeld, all too often analysed through a limited number of data or
interviews. To start with, we explain our choice for a panel of ﬁve generalist
newspapers and ﬁve business newspapers from different European countries within
the Factiva database.
Map 2.42 International port trafﬁc, 2012. Values weighted by time-distance to the ports
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2.3.1 The Choice of Our Corpus of European Newspapers
From Factiva we have constructed our own database translating the spatial vision of
a part of the European press. We selected national flagship reference media in
Europe which regularly and comprehensively reference their articles and have a
wide audience. In order to compare them, we selected two types of press: general
media, open to a wide cross-section of the public; and a more specialised press
focused on business, for two reasons: (i) the economic potential of the neigh-
bourhoods is widely under-estimated by European stakeholders beyond oil and gas
procurements, and (ii) business newspapers make a quite homogenous corpus
whereas generalist newspapers necessarily show a wider variety of thematic sub-
jects from one media to another. We chose one generalist newspaper and one
business newspaper in ﬁve major European countries (only economic for the Czech
media, see Table 2.3), under the assumption that the French, Italian and Spanish
media would rather report on Mediterranean neighbourhood’s events, the German
and Czech media rather on East neighbourhood’s ones. Not least than 2.4 million
international (i.e. excluding the articles on the newspaper’s country) press articles
were analysed, over two periods: 1998–2000 so as to cover, in particular, the
on-going change in the Eastern neighbourhood in transition, and 2010–2012 so as
to cover, in particular, the Arab spring.
2.3.2 Silence and Noise in the European Media Regarding
Neighbourhoods
The ﬁrst result is that European newspapers pay a small and declining attention to
the neighbourhoods. Over the two periods, 1998–2000 and 2010–2012, 15 % of the
2.4 million analysed international articles focussed on at least one neighbour
country. 17 % of the articles in general newspapers include a reference to these
Table 2.3 Factiva corpus of part of the European press used by ITAN
Country Generalist newspapers Economic newspapers
France Libération La Tribune
Germany Suddeutsche Zeitung Financial Times Deutschland
Italy Corriere della Sera Italia Oggi
Great Britain The Guardian Financial Times UK
Spain El Mundo Cinco Dias
Czech Republic Hospodarske Noviny
Notes
Periods 1998–2000 and 2010–2012
The Italian and German newspapers were only included for the period 2010–2012
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countries, whilst the percentage is only 13.5 % for economic newspapers. This
conﬁrms that the European business milieu pays rather scant attention to the
neighbourhoods.
French newspapers make a relatively large effort to report information from
there: on average, in our sample 21 % of French international articles addressed this
area; then come British newspapers with 19 %. A striking difference is that the
French generalist newspaper reports many events whereas the French business
newspaper reports on the neighbourhoods in only 11 % of its articles. The British
business newspaper shows much more interest in the neighbourhoods; even the
German business newspaper reports more on the neighbourhoods than its French or
Spanish counterparts (Fig. 2.9).
Another concern comes from the evolution, since media attention to neighbour
countries has rather declined between the two periods: 18.4 % in 1998–2000 but
15.7 % in 2010–2012. Here the ﬁgures differ according to the type of newspaper:
for general newspapers they went from 25 to 15 %, for economic newspapers from
13 to 14 %. This suggests a progressive awareness of the European business milieu.
It also differs according to the reported countries. From the ﬁrst period (1998–2000)
to the second (2010–2012) the spatial breakdown shows the decline of media
coverage of the Western Balkans, for the beneﬁt of two Arab countries in transition:
Tunisia and Libya. The map pictures a—relatively—growing interest of the
Mediterranean.
By country, Russia achieves the highest coverage level with 3.5 % of our
sample. A small group of countries receive a 1–1.5 % amount of media coverage
due either to the magnitude of the events taking place (Egypt and Serbia) or to the
business and political ties with the European Union (Turkey and Israel). All other
neighbour countries are under 1 %.
Fig. 2.9 Share of articles on neighbour countries in ITAN international articles’ sample, 1998–00
and 2010–12
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Analysis by nationality of the considered newspaper brings further information:
– As we expected the French press is more open to the Mediterranean than the
other European media. The speciﬁcity of the French generalist newspaper is that
it covers the whole neighbourhoods, with a focus on Russia and Turkey. The
neighbourhoods geography of the business French newspaper is quite similar to
that of its European counterparts.
– The coverage of the Italian media is concentrated on a small number of coun-
tries: Russia and Turkey, and Libya for the business newspaper. Conversely and
surprisingly, Italy neglects some countries in close Western Balkans such as
Kosovo and Serbia.
– Spain has a quite balanced coverage, with its business newspaper being focused
on Russia, Turkey and Maghreb especially Morocco.
Map 2.43 Number (per capita) of articles on each neighbour country in ITAN international
articles’ sample, 1998–2000 and 2010–2012
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– The British press, including business, holds little interest in the Maghreb events
and more (along with Russia) in countries such as Turkey, Egypt, Libya and
Serbia, but not that much, for the business newspaper, in the English speaking
Near East.
– The general German newspaper concentrates on Russia and Turkey, the busi-
ness one has a wider outlook including Tunisia—where the German enterprises
have recently signiﬁcantly invested, but not the Western Balkans.
– The press in the Czech Republic pays attention to a quite wide range of
countries, and, compared with the other newspapers, less to the most important
countries elsewhere: Turkey and…Russia—a surprising result.
The last result is that when we remove the demographic and economic effects,
war areas and the Mediterranean show up. The following maps calculate a media
Map 2.44 Number (per GDP) of articles on each neighbour country in ITAN international
articles’ sample, 1998–2000 and 2010–2012
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coverage factor that is independent of the neighbour countries’ demographic
(Map 2.43) and economic (Map 2.44) weight. Per capita, Near East becomes the
major area under European press scrutiny along with Western Balkans and Libya,
that is to say the area of recent or actual unrest. Two further smaller focus areas can
be added: Georgia and Tunisia. We can conclude that the primary thing that
interests European readers in the neighbourhoods is political threat.
When measured per GDP, the result changes. The poorest countries receive
better media coverage: Kosovo and Montenegro, Georgia, Libya and even Jordan.
Conversely, some countries with higher GDP like Russia or Israel receive fewer
mentions in the newspapers. Only Turkey stands out. According to this per GDP
indicator, Belarus, Algeria, Morocco, Serbia and even Croatia show very lowly
interesting to European readers.
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